auction-theory

Shows an auction mechanism as a mapping from bid profiles b to allocation x(b) and payments p(b), then animates the incentive-compatibility (envelope) link: a monotone allocation rule x(v) pins payments p(v) up to a constant. The final stage highlights Revenue Equivalence: with the same allocation rule and a shared normalization p(0), different IC auction formats yield the same expected payments (seller revenue).

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t=0s

practical uses

01.Explaining why second-price and (properly normalized) alternative IC mechanisms can have identical expected revenue under IPV assumptions
02.Teaching the envelope theorem intuition: payments are determined by allocation monotonicity in single-parameter environments
03.Comparing auction designs by focusing on allocation rules (efficiency vs. reserve prices) rather than payment details

technical notes

Pure Canvas2D, green-on-black blocky UI with snapped coordinates. A 3-stage 4.2s cycle: (1) mechanism outputs x,p, (2) envelope visualization with shaded ∫x and v·x rectangle, (3) revenue equivalence callout. Allocation curve is a quantized monotone S-shape for a retro step-plot aesthetic.

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